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1. Introduction 
The recent adoption of risk-sensitive regulatory approaches, such as the European Solvency II 
framework (EIOPA, 2009), has led to an expansion in the use of complex quantitative models by 
insurance organisations, with applications ranging from economic capital calculations to strategic 
decision making. As models are increasingly embedded in insurers’ operations to measure and 
manage risks, academics, practitioners and regulators call attention to ‘model risk’, namely the risk 
of adverse consequences arising from decisions based on incorrect model outputs (Federal Reserve, 
2011). In particular, problems arising from epistemic uncertainties due to scarcity of data (e.g. 
Bignozzi and Tsanakas, 2016); the endogeneity of financial risk (Danielsson and Shin, 2002); and the 
challenges of governance around models (Cadoni, 2014; Aggarwal et al., 2016) are increasingly 
scrutinised.  
Despite the growing use of models, we still know little about how key stakeholders in organisations 
deal with models in their daily practice. Some papers have considered the role of formal analysis in 
organisational decision-making (e.g., Langley 1989; Cabantous and Gond 2010; Cabantous et al. 
2011), but there is still a lot to learn about the work of modellers and ‘quant’ people in 
organisations; particularly on how their practices facilitate (or not) the embedding and expansion of 
model use. Here, we aim to make a first step in that direction, by studying the practices of 
professional modellers, who are key agents in developing and deploying quantitative models in 
insurance businesses. Specifically, we ask: How do professional modellers facilitate the expansion of 
model use?  
We address this question through a qualitative study on the development and use of internal capital 
models in insurance firms operating in the London Insurance Market. These models – a specific type 
of simulation-based quantitative models – provide insurance firms with a representation of their 
portfolio structure, as well as probability distributions for pertinent sources of uncertainty, such as 
the number and severity of insurance claims, inflation, asset returns, etc.   
Our study of the practices by which modellers in the London Market develop such models has two 
major findings. First, it shows that modellers facilitate the embedding of the model in the 
organisation by maintaining the model ‘ajar’, that is, they interact with different types of 
stakeholders (such as underwriters and board members) around specific areas of the model. In so 
doing, they produce a model that is neither completely ‘closed’ – hence enabling stakeholders to 
have some form of control on the development and deployment of the model –nor fully ‘open’, 
which would prevent the model from being useful. We call ‘ajarness’ this state of partial opening of 
the model, which modellers enact through their modelling practices.  
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Second, we show that modellers enable stakeholders to engage with the model in a way that is 
consistent with stakeholders’ own conception of the model and uncertainty. Through their practices, 
modellers address stakeholders’ concerns and uncertainties about the model, and in so doing they 
enact stakeholders’ conceptions of the model. As they engage in this way with various types of 
stakeholders, modellers create a model that is ‘flexible’ enough to be consistent with multiple 
conceptions of the model and of uncertainty, thus facilitating expansion of model use. Such co-
existence of alternative conceptions of the model and of uncertainty is consistent with previous 
discussions on cultures of model use (Tsanakas et al., 2016; Tsanakas and Cabantous, 2017), to which 
our study, while different in its framing, gives an empirical underpinning.  
 
2. Context, data and method 
Our study focuses on the development and increasing use of internal capital models in the London 
Insurance Market. This market, which comprises Lloyd’s, is a specialised insurance market for 
international trading of non-life insurance and reinsurance business, including high-exposure risks, 
such as those arising from natural catastrophes. While London Market professionals have used 
complex quantitative models for more than 20 years, e.g. in pricing catastrophe risks (Grossi and 
Kunreuther, 2005), the use of internal capital models expanded more recently, first with the 
association between regulatory capital and model outputs under the former UK-wide ICAS regime in 
2003, and further with the coming in force of the European Solvency II regulatory regime in 2016.   
Insurers use internal capital models in order to compute probability distributions of various 
quantities of interest, such as a portfolio’s net asset value at a given time horizon. Some properties 
of those distributions, such as means or quantiles, are also outputs that business users incorporate 
in their decision-making. In particular, under the Solvency II regime, which applies to the London 
Market, the minimum level of safe assets that an insurance firm must hold is calculated as the 99.5th 
percentile of firm’s position, at a 1-year horizon (‘1-in-200 years loss’). 
To conduct our study, we interviewed 31 practitioners  active in the London Market. We targeted in 
particular professional modellers, typically actuaries, who interact directly with the model, e.g. by 
running it, analysing and communicating its outputs, and modifying its inputs and specification. 
Furthermore, we interviewed stakeholders who interact differently with the model, such as board 
members, underwriters and regulators. Through semi-structured interviews, which lasted from one 
to two hours, we explored themes such as internal capital models’ areas of use and fitness-for-
purpose, as well as the impact of the regulatory process and the challenges of dealing with model 
uncertainty. Interviews were recorded and fully transcribed.  
While analysing the interview transcripts, we first focused on modellers’ activities in relation to 
model development and use. In a second step, we examined what modellers achieve through these 
activities. We realised that these activities enable modellers to interact with three types of 
stakeholders (modellers, underwriters and board members) in order to open with them areas of the 
model that are of interest to them. We therefore linked modelling activities to specific areas of the 
model, and stakeholders. Third, it became clearer that through these activities, modellers attempt to 
address stakeholders’ specific concerns and uncertainties about the model and its uses.  
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3. Model ajarness: opening the model to address stakeholder concerns 
3.1 Opening the model 
We find that modellers open some aspects of the model to different stakeholders, in the context of 
specific business processes. By ‘open’ we mean that a particular aspect of the model is exposed to 
modification, investigation, or debate, by the modellers themselves or by other stakeholders. But 
not all aspects of the model are open to all stakeholders; hence some aspects of the model remain 
‘closed’, that is, taken for granted, if they do not resonate with stakeholders’ concerns. We refer to 
this process of partial opening as model ajarness.  
Aspects of the model that modellers open through their activities include the model’s input 
parameters, its design (with the associated limitations and capabilities), the relationship between 
model inputs and outputs, and the processes by which modelling decisions are made. Furthermore, 
the model itself can be seen as an agglomeration of smaller ‘local’ sub-models. Hence, what may be 
opened is an aspect of the model pertaining to the performance of a specific line of business or, 
alternatively, to the portfolio as a whole.  
In Table 1, a non-exhaustive summary of modeller activities, associated concerns, and areas of the 
model opened is presented. In what follows, we discuss these further and sketch which parts of the 
model are opened, to which stakeholders, and why.  
 
Table 1: Modeller activities, stakeholder concerns, and areas of the model opened. 
Modeller activities Concerns addressed by activities Areas of the model opened 
(A1) Choosing and updating the 
model’s parameters 
(A2) Performing and 
interpreting validation tests 
(A3) Changing the way 
something is modelled  
(C1) Technical validity: does the model 
satisfy technical standards? 
(C2) Realism: are the model design and 
properties consistent with modellers’ 
understanding of the business? 
 
Model parameters 
Model structure and design 
Input/output interactions (for 
validation purposes) 
(A4) Explaining the model’s 
design and limitations 
(A5) Generating business 
recommendations 
(A6) Responding to challenge 
and negotiating the model 
specification  
(A7) Responding to challenge 
and negotiating the model’s 
scope of applications 
(C3) Operational usefulness: can the 
model be used to support the specific 
decisions that users need to take? 
(C4) Consistency with underwriter 
judgement: are the recommendations 
of the model consistent with the 
judgements and preferences of 
underwriters? 
Model structure and design 
(focus on capabilities and 
limitations) 
Input/output interactions (at 
the level of line-of-business)  
Model parameters (at the level 
of line-of-business) 
Model scope of application (in 
relation to specific decisions) 
(A8) Presenting model outputs 
(A9) Running the model to 
investigate scenarios and 
opportunities 
(A10) Evidencing how modelling 
judgements have been made 
(C5) Performance implications of 
strategic choice: what does the model 
indicate that the risk / reward trade-
offs will be under alternative 
strategies? 
(C6) Governance: are modelling 
judgements carried out by sufficiently 
qualified staff, using rigorous 
processes? 
Input/output interactions (at 
the level of the whole 
portfolio)  
Model parameters (only those 
that affect the risk profile of 
the portfolio as a whole)  
Modelling process and 
governance 
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3.2 Modellers 
Our interviews suggest that a persistent concern among modellers revolves around maintaining the 
model’s fitness-for-purpose, involving its technical validity (Concern 1 – C1), as evaluated by formal 
(e.g. statistical tests) and informal  (e.g. expert opinion) means. For instance, modellers receive new 
data every year, because of the new business being planned and underwritten; they “ensure that 
[the] model is still fit for purpose and if it is, then all the parameters that you use are fit for 
purpose”. In addition, modellers are deeply involved with model validation, as they “need to 
produce the results for it – also [they] need to be able to then understand the results and maybe 
justify the results as well.” (Capital Modeller). Thus, to address concerns relating to technical validity 
(C1), modellers engage in choosing and updating the model’s parameters (Activity 1 – A1), taking 
into account new data, as well as performing and interpreting validation tests (A2).  
 
A distinct set of concerns relates to the issue of whether the representation of the business encoded 
in the model is realistic (C2), that is, whether the model design and properties are consistent with 
modellers’ understanding of the business. A Chief Actuary explains: 
“Last year we completely rebuilt our credit risk model and we buy a lot of reinsurance… Our 
credit risk modelling wasn’t quite … it was, I guess, what you call a standard approach using 
default rates and everything else, but it wasn’t … I think we were expected to be better than 
that… there are always lots of ways you can think of to improve your modelling, but you 
strike a balance between what’s practical and what’s realistic.”  
Hence, to address the concerns on realism (C2), modellers opened the model’s design and changed 
the way something is modelled (A3). In this example, the fact that the company is buying a lot of 
reinsurance meant that realism of the credit risk model was a concern that was prioritised (credit 
risk modelling is used to quantify the potential of a reinsurer to default). Hence, we see that 
concerns about realism (C2) depend on the specifics of a company’s portfolio.  
3.3 Underwriters 
The model is typically used as a decision support tool for underwriters, in the context of processes 
such as business planning, for instance to determine the optimal amount of exposure in particular 
lines of business or to evaluate the portfolio performance under alternative reinsurance 
configurations. Through such applications of the model, modellers interact extensively with 
underwriters: 
“As soon as you start mentioning limitations… frequently this is used as an excuse by people 
to ignore the model. The question then becomes: “well how granular do we want the model 
to be”?  And that’s now becoming a challenge because as the appetite increases and senior 
management becomes more educated in this… they get more interested and they want 
more out of this tool… it means the model needs to give more but in order to give more you 
need to have more granularity.”  (Capital Modeller).  
A main concern among underwriters is whether the model can be used to support the specific 
decisions that they need to take, that is, they are concerned with the model’s operational usefulness 
(C3). Limitations in the extent of bottom-up detail of the portfolio captured (‘granularity’) imply that 
the model cannot be used to answer all questions underwriters may have. Therefore, modellers 
need to explain the model’s design and limitations (A4) to underwriters. This interaction may lead 
modellers to enhance the model usefulness by changing the model design (A3), such as its 
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granularity. Whether these changes are implemented depends heavily on the balance of perceived 
benefits and resource constraints. 
Since modellers also use the model to generate business recommendations (A5), they open to 
underwriters the modelled relations between inputs (e.g. the expected profitability and the amount 
of premium to be written for a particular line of business) and output (e.g. portfolio performance). 
As a result, the values of model parameters for the line of business considered are sometimes 
discussed, even when underwriters do not have a specific concern with technical validity, as 
explained by a senior actuary:  
“You’ll always see [challenge of model assumptions] from the underwriting side because it’s 
affecting their business plan.  If we turn round and say “we think this account’s poor and 
isn’t going to make you a good return”, then that may affect how much of that income they 
can write next year. So underwriters will challenge that…  and we will challenge ourselves to 
say “well are we right on this?”” 
The use of the model, while supporting underwriters’ decision-making, also restricts underwriters’ 
freedom in acting according to their own judgements e.g. as to how much business they should be 
writing. Therefore, a concern arises for underwriters as to whether recommendations derived from 
the model are consistent with their judgement (C4). When underwriters sense such inconsistency, 
they may choose to dispute the validity of the model, including that of key statistical input 
parameters affecting the modelled profile of their line of business. Modellers subsequently need to 
respond to challenge and negotiate the model specification (A6) with underwriters. The model 
specification therefore is also the result of a negotiation, to which modellers’ efforts to satisfy their 
own concerns around technical validity (C1) and realism (C2) form a baseline rather than the last 
word. 
The concern for consistency with underwriters’ judgements (C4) motivates debate not only of the 
model specification, but, more broadly, of its appropriate scope of applications. In one example, a 
CRO explained how modellers generated a recommendation for an underwriter to reduce the 
amount of reinsurance bought. The underwriter resisted the recommendation for reasons not to do 
with the model’s perceived validity but because of commercial reasons, arguing (as reported by the 
CRO) that he has to “continue that relationship” with a reinsurer, because this reinsurer “helped 
[him] out” at one point when the underwriter “had a very bad time”. Consequently, modellers need 
to respond to challenge and negotiate the model’s scope of applications (A7). Other respondents 
described similar debates with underwriters and senior management about whether 
recommendations generated with the model should be followed in particular areas and situations.   
3.4 Board  
Boards have less opportunity and reason to interact directly with the model. They typically get 
information on the model when modellers present model outputs (A8) either via periodic reports on 
important management information, such as their firm’s regulatory and economic capital, or in the 
context of exploring strategic opportunities. For example, a board member outlined how the model 
has been used to evaluate the possibility of expanding the business to a new territory.  
“Somebody may say “well I'd like to recruit this chap here, he's got a particular specialty in 
an area that we don't cover, this is what we think his business model could look like, what 
he's likely to do”. It's then taken and run through the model and we say, “well no that's not 
going to be worthwhile”.” 
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Here, the board’s concern revolves around performance implications of a strategic choice (C5) – 
when the proposal is “run through the model”, the risk and return of the portfolio under the 
proposed strategy is calculated. Risk in those cases typically represents concrete costs in terms of 
capital requirements. Thus, the activity through which modellers address the board’s concern is 
running the model to investigate scenarios and opportunities (A9). Through this activity, some 
input/output interactions in the model are opened up to the board – these interactions usually 
relate to the portfolio as a whole, rather than a specific line of business, as is the case when 
modellers open the model to underwriters. 
Through the writing of reports or in the context of discussions with board members, modellers once 
again open input/output interactions, for instance through the presentation of analyses of change 
and waterfall charts. But this opening is selective, as only the most important changes and inputs are 
discussed in detail with the board. Furthermore, highly technical detail on the model inputs is 
typically not discussed: 
“Suppose we’d moved a few degrees of freedom in a t-copula1… I mean, I try not to use 
those words to start with.  I don’t know. What do we do in similar situations?  If it’s 
judgement, we say it’s judgement.  This is whose judgement it is.  These are the people who 
have discussed it.  These are the reasons why on balance they plumped for that.” (Chief Risk 
Officer) 
Instead, board members, seem concerned with the process by which modelling judgements have 
been made, which reflects a board concern around governance (C6): as board members do not have 
the time and expertise to provide a detailed review of technical decisions, they need to make sure 
that modelling judgements are carried out by sufficiently qualified staff, using rigorous processes. 
Modellers address this concern by evidencing how modelling judgements have been made (A10). 
 
4. Creating a ‘flexible’ model that supports alternative conceptions  
Our analysis also shows that modellers facilitate the expansion of model use by creating a model 
that is flexible. Despite the fact that all stakeholders deal with the same model, we found that they 
have different modes of engagement with it: they each engage with the model in a way that is 
consistent with their own conception of the model and concerns (or uncertainties) about it. As each 
stakeholder does so, multiple (in our case: three) conceptions of the model and uncertainty are 
enacted, as presented in Table 2 and elaborated on below.  
First, through their activities, modellers enact the model as a representation of the world. This 
conception of the model is directly linked to modellers’ concerns with technical validity (C1) and 
realism (C2), which point to a view of the model in technical terms, as a mathematical/statistical 
representation of the business and its external environment, encoded within specialised software. 
This conception of the model also reflects a specific view of uncertainty. Since for modellers the 
model is a representation, uncertainty, for them, refers to the observation that there are multiple 
such representations that pass modellers’ validity and realism checks. Furthermore, alternative 
                                                          
1 Degrees of freedom are important parameters of t-copulas, statistical functions that enable the modelling of 
joint occurrence of extreme losses. Changes in those parameters has typically a substantial impact on outputs 
such as regulatory capital – at the same time they are hard to estimate from available data and are usually set 
by expert judgement.   
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model specifications can lead to substantially different outputs. As a senior actuary tasked with 
estimating key parameters said:  
“But for certain key assumptions, we’ll have alternate views.  We’ll sort of say “look, the 
correct assumption could be anywhere between here and here.  We’ve picked one because 
we have to pick one”. And when we’re doing our capital modelling we will make sure that 
we’re looking at “well what’s the impact if we go at the lower end, what’s the impact if 
we’re at the higher end?” So we can judge how material this assumption is.”  
An assessment of the impact of uncertainty thus conceived goes through sensitivity analysis: 
investigating the implications for the model output of using alternative assumptions.  
 
Table 2: Concerns and conceptions of models and uncertainty of different stakeholder groups 
Concerns Conception of the 
model 
Conception of uncertainty Stakeholder group 
(C1) Technical validity 
(C2) Realism 
Representation of 
the world 
Multiplicity of technically 
plausible representations 
Modellers 
(C3) Operational usefulness 
(C4) Consistency with 
underwriter judgement  
Instrument of 
control 
Practices affected by an 
instrument that is not fully 
understood, in ways outside 
users’ control 
Underwriters 
(C5) Performance implications 
of strategic choice 
(C6) Governance 
Calculative engine 
Model gives outputs with 
adverse strategic implications 
Inherent limitations of 
quantitative modelling 
Board 
 
Second, our analysis suggests that modellers’ activities enact the model as an instrument of control. 
This conception mostly emerges from the activities that aim at dealing with underwriters’ concerns – 
in particular operational usefulness (C1) and consistency with underwriter judgement (C2) – and 
which suggest that underwriters primarily see the model in terms of its disciplinary and controlling 
power, sometimes fearing that it may, to some extent, supplant them:  
“So it’s changed the way the businesses are run, they tend to be more run by finance and 
risk management people, and they lack the experience.  […] Now the problem is, 
underwriters are busy out underwriting and marketing. So while they’ve been busy, or you 
could even say sceptical about all of this, there’s been a whole bunch of things done and 
life’s moved on without them. There’s a danger that it [the model] is used in a certain way 
which brings a company down or, makes it a weaker entity.” 
The expanding uses of models produce new constraints and incentives for underwriting decisions, 
which can feel undesirable to underwriters, reflecting their concern for consistency with 
underwriting judgements (C4), and ultimately their uncertainties both about what the tool does (and 
can do) and their future role in the organisation. Moreover, a model seen as threatening to 
undermine underwriters’ autonomy can also be perceived as opaque or of limited practical use (C3). 
These concerns therefore point to a specific view of uncertainty, as lack of understanding of the new 
work situation, where underwriters’ working practices are affected by an instrument they do not 
understand fully, and in ways that are partly outside their control.  
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Modeller activities aim at assuaging those concerns through negotiation and accepting challenge 
(A6, A7), working towards a convergence of underwriters’ views and the model’s representation of 
the business. A Chief Actuary describes disagreements between modellers and underwriters in the 
context of business planning.  
“For this year, actually, we’ve agreed that for planning purposes, we’re going to use the 
internal model, the actuarial numbers. But what’s happened is that, we’ve converged with 
the underwriters. And I think we’ve converged for a number of reasons, one is they’ve 
moved closer to us and actually, we might have moved a bit to them as well. We’ve reached 
a compromise.”  
Such convergence however, is not always complete. The remaining disagreements are often 
managed by granting underwriters the discretion to not pursue model-based recommendations, as a 
CRO explains: 
“We view the models as providing a consistent framework. A starting point for the 
underwriting judgement if you like. But the underwriter is at liberty to charge what they like 
and what the market will let them.”  
Third, modellers enact the model as a calculative engine, especially through their activities related to 
boards’ concerns. Our analysis suggests that, for boards, models are above all formulas that 
generate performance and risk metrics under current and alternative strategies. Modellers 
sometimes find that boards can be less interested in discussing the broader meaning of model 
outputs than in drawing precise conclusions from them: 
“I think I wanted the [risk] tolerance stuff to spark a debate, but management and risk 
people, they like red, amber, green charts – they like clear, defined lines.” (Chief Actuary) 
Satisfying the board’s concern about performance implications of a strategic choice (C5) requires 
unambiguously interpreted outputs. Boards’ governance concerns (C6) are intricately related to such 
a perception of the model, revolving mostly around the correctness of such model outputs. This view 
is rather distinct from modellers’ concerns of the model’s validity as representation. Boards’ focus is 
not on the model as an abstraction but as an (albeit complicated) formula for generating numbers 
that are useful in their decision-making. Their narrower focus frames what they mean by the model’s 
‘correctness’: that sufficient checks have been performed by qualified professionals.  
Correspondingly, boards’ uncertainty revolves around the possibility that the model-as-calculative-
engine produces numbers that have adverse strategic implications, such as an excessively large level 
of regulatory capital. Modellers, through running the model to investigate scenarios and 
opportunities (A9) enable boards to prepare for (and avoid) such eventualities. In that context, 
uncertainty around the multitude of technically plausible models, as experienced by modellers, is 
not a major concern for boards. Given that their governance constraints have been addressed, e.g. 
that sufficient validation has been performed and evidenced (A10), boards do not spend time 
agonising over alternative plausible models – instead they take the model for granted. As one board 
member told us: 
“I suppose that my view [about whether] the internal model could give us a very different 
result would be no, I don't think it probably could. You might use slightly different 
techniques on this or slightly different techniques on that. A different actuary might well say, 
no, I want to simulate this slightly differently. I can't feel that we would actually come up 
with an answer which is dramatically different to that which we had.” 
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Such a view does not mean that boards are impervious to uncertainty or unfamiliar with models’ 
limitations. Their view of uncertainty refers not to specific shortcomings of their own model, but to 
broader limitations of quantitative modelling as such, particularly in relation to capturing novel and 
extreme risk scenarios.  
“It’s very reasonable to think, “Okay what is the next asbestos?”  Or, “Is something going to 
come out of cell phones that nobody knew about?”  There is going to be some disease later 
on; I think it’s very difficult.  You can only reasonably model for what has gone before and 
the exposures you see on your books, that’s all you can do. […] You’ve got to keep going as 
if, you’ve got to keep going as if…”  
Boards themselves seem to manage such uncertainty by accepting that the model should inform 
decisions, but form only one of several inputs into the decision process. This is consistent with a 
view of the model as valid, but intrinsically limited.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We studied how modellers facilitate the embedding and expansion in the use of internal capital 
models by their London Market organisations. Our notions of ‘ajarness’ and ‘flexibility’ summarise 
modellers’ key achievement: producing a model that is partially open, while accommodating 
stakeholders’ alternative conceptions of it. 
The co-existence of alternative conceptions of models and uncertainty forces compromises. 
Modellers witness their notion of uncertainty being transformed, as it journeys through the 
organisation: from a technical idea relating to alternative statistical assumptions, to a deeply political 
notion relating to the role of models in the workplace, to a concern about the implications of the 
model-as-calculative-engine. Uncertainty sometimes is an enabler: for example, without an 
acknowledgement of the plausibility of multiple model specifications, there would be less scope for 
negotiation between modellers and underwriters. 
At the same time, enabling stakeholders to engage with the model in their own way, limits the 
extent to which modellers can enact their own conception of the model. For example, modellers 
sometimes find that boards have limited appetite for understanding the extent of model 
uncertainty, as seen by modellers, as such a technical conception of uncertainty is not directly 
related to the board’s concerns. According to our analysis this is understandable and even necessary 
for the embedding of the model. However, a new concern arises: whether through the effort to 
embed the model and expand its uses, crucial information about its technical limitations gets lost 
within the organisation. We see this as a key issue for governance in an industry where complex 
quantitative models have an increasingly dominant role. 
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